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Cyber Security — Personnel & Training

Technical Rationale and Justification for
Reliability Standard CIP-004-8

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RELIABILITY | RESILIENCE | SECURITY



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Technical Rationale for Reliability Standard CIP-004-8

Introduction

This document explains the technical rationale and justification for the proposed Reliability Standard CIP-004-8. It provides stakeholders and the ERO Enterprise with an understanding of the technology and technical requirements in the Reliability Standard. This Technical Rationale and Justifications for CIP-004-8 is not a Reliability Standard and should not be considered mandatory and enforceable.

Updates to this document now include the Project 2016-02 – Modifications to CIP Standards Drafting Team’s (SDT’s) intent in drafting changes to the requirements.

Background

The Version 5 Transition advisory Group (V5TAG), which consists of representatives from NERC, Regional Entities, and industry stakeholders, was formed to issue guidance regarding possible methods to achieve compliance with the CIP V5 standards and to support industry’s implementation activities. During the course of the V5TAG’s activities, the V5TAG identified certain issues with the CIP Reliability Standards that were more appropriately addressed by a standard drafting team (SDT). The V5TAG developed the V5TAG Transfer Document to explain the issues and recommend that they be considered in future development activity. As Project 2016-02 was formed to address the directives in FERC Order 822 issued on January 21, 2016, that team also received the V5TAG issues as part of its Standard Authorization Request (SAR).

One of the issues identified by the V5TAG was virtualization. The V5TAG Transfer document states, “The CIP Version 5 standards do not specifically address virtualization. However, because of the increasing use of virtualization in industrial control system environments, questions around treatment of virtualization within the CIP Standards are due for consideration. The SDT should consider revisions to CIP-005 and the definitions of Cyber Asset and Electronic Access Point that make clear the permitted architecture and address the security risks of network, server and storage virtualization technologies.”

New and Modified Terms and Applicability

This standard uses new or modified terms and contains new or modified exemptions in Section 4 Applicability. The rationale for this global content can be found in “CIP Definitions and Exemptions Technical Rationale.” Document for reference when reading the technical rationale that follows.

Requirement R1-R6

General Considerations

The Project 2016-02 SDT made conforming changes to Reliability Standard CIP-004-8 to align personnel and training requirements with the virtualization changes.

To enable CIP-004-8 for virtualization, the SDT added “Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) supporting an Applicable System in this Part” within the Applicable Systems column of each of the Parts for Requirement R1 – Requirement R6.

Additionally, where the term BES Cyber System (BCS) was used in the requirement language, it is replaced with “Applicable Systems” to align the requirement language of each Requirement Part with the updated applicability for each Requirement Part.

Requirement R3 Part 3.5

Summary of Changes:

A CIP Exceptional Circumstance was added as an exception to “Process to ensure that individuals with authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access have had a personnel risk assessment completed according to Parts 3.1 through 3.4 within the last seven years” such that individuals granted authorized electronic access and authorized unescorted physical access have undergone the personnel risk assessment processes.

Change Rationale:

The SDT determined Responsible Entities cannot require personnel risk assessments for first responders prior to granting them authorized unescorted physical access during certain conditions that qualify as CIP Exceptional Circumstances.

Former Background Section from Reliability Standard CIP-004-7

The section **6. Background** has been retired and removed from the Standard, and preserved by cutting and pasting as-is below.

Background

Standard CIP-004 exists as part of a suite of CIP Standards related to cyber security, which require the initial identification and categorization of BES Cyber Systems and require a minimum level of organizational, operational, and procedural controls to mitigate risk to BES Cyber Systems.

Most requirements open with, *“Each Responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented [processes, plan, etc.] that include the applicable items in [Table Reference].”* The referenced table requires the applicable items in the procedures for the common subject matter of the requirements.

The term *documented processes* refers to a set of required instructions specific to the Responsible Entity and to achieve a specific outcome. This term does not imply any particular naming or approval structure beyond what is stated in the requirements. An entity should include as much as it believes necessary in its documented processes, but it must address the applicable requirements in the table.

The terms *program* and *plan* are sometimes used in place of documented processes where it makes sense and is commonly understood. For example, documented processes describing a response are typically referred to as plans (i.e., incident response plans and recovery plans). Likewise, a security plan can describe an approach involving multiple procedures to address a broad subject matter.

Similarly, the term *program* may refer to the organization’s overall implementation of its policies, plans and procedures involving a subject matter. Examples in the standards include the personnel risk assessment program and the personnel training program. The full implementation of the CIP Cyber Security Standards could also be referred to as a program. However, the terms *program* and *plan* do not imply any additional requirements beyond what is stated in the standards.

Responsible Entities can implement common controls that meet requirements for multiple high and medium impact BES Cyber Systems. For example, a single training program could meet the requirements for training personnel across multiple BES Cyber Systems.

Measures for the initial requirement are simply the documented processes themselves. Measures in the table rows provide examples of evidence to show documentation and implementation of applicable items in the documented processes. These measures serve to provide guidance to entities in acceptable records of compliance and should not be viewed as an all-inclusive list.

Throughout the standards, unless otherwise stated, bulleted items in the requirements and measures are items that are linked with an “or,” and numbered items are items that are linked with an “and.”

Many references in the Applicability section use a threshold of 300 MW for UFLS and UVLS. This particular threshold of 300 MW for UVLS and UFLS was provided in Version 1 of the CIP Cyber Security Standards. The threshold remains at 300 MW since it is specifically addressing UVLS and UFLS, which are last ditch efforts to save the BES. A review of UFLS tolerances defined within regional reliability standards for UFLS program requirements to date indicates that the historical value of 300 MW represents an adequate and reasonable threshold value for allowable UFLS operational tolerances.

“Applicable Systems” Columns in Tables:

Each table has an “Applicable Systems” column to further define the scope of systems to which a specific requirement row applies. The CSO706 SDT adapted this concept from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Risk Management Framework as a way of applying requirements more appropriately based on impact and connectivity characteristics.

The following conventions are used in the “Applicable Systems” column as described. □ High Impact BES Cyber Systems – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as high impact according to the CIP-002-5.1 identification and categorization processes.

- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems – Applies to BES Cyber Systems categorized as medium impact according to the CIP-002-5.1a identification and categorization processes.
- Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity – Only applies to medium impact BES Cyber Systems with External Routable Connectivity. This also excludes Cyber Assets in the BES Cyber System that cannot be directly accessed through External Routable Connectivity.
- Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) – Applies to each Electronic Access Control or Monitoring System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System. Examples may include, but are not limited to, firewalls, authentication servers, and log monitoring and alerting systems.
- Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) – Applies to each Physical Access Control System associated with a referenced high impact BES Cyber System or medium impact BES Cyber System with External Routable Connectivity.

Technical Rationale for Reliability Standard CIP-004-7

General Considerations for Requirement R1

None

Rationale for Requirement R1

The security awareness program is intended to be an informational program, not a formal training program. It should reinforce security practices to ensure that personnel maintain awareness of best practices for both physical and electronic security to protect its BES Cyber Systems. The Responsible Entity is not required to provide records that show each individual received or understood the information, but they must maintain documentation of the program materials utilized in the form of posters, memos, and/or presentations.

Requirement R2

General Considerations for Requirement R2

None

Rationale for Requirement R2

Training shall cover the policies, access controls, and procedures as developed for the BES Cyber Systems and include, at a minimum, the required items appropriate to personnel roles and responsibilities from Table Requirement R2.

One new element in the training content is intended to encompass networking hardware and software and other issues of electronic interconnectivity supporting the operation and control of BES Cyber Systems as per FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 434. Additionally, training should address the risk posed when connecting and using Transient Cyber Assets (TCA) and Removable Media with BES Cyber Systems or within an Electronic Security Perimeter. As noted in FERC Order No. 791, Paragraph 135, TCA and Removable Media have been the source of incidents where malware was introduced into electric generation industrial control systems in real-world situations. Training on their use is a key element in protecting BES Cyber Systems. This is not intended to provide technical training to individuals supporting networking hardware and software, but educating system users of the cyber security risks associated with the interconnectedness of these systems. The users, based on their function, role, or responsibility, should have a basic understanding of which systems can be accessed from other systems and how the actions they take can affect cyber security.

Each Responsible Entity shall ensure all personnel who are granted authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to its BES Cyber Systems, including contractors and service vendors, complete cyber security training prior to their being granted authorized access, except for CIP Exceptional Circumstances. To retain the authorized accesses, individuals must complete the training at least one every 15 months.

Requirement R3

General Considerations for Requirement R3

None

Rationale for Requirement R3

Each Responsible Entity shall ensure a personnel risk assessment is performed for all personnel who are granted authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to its BES Cyber Systems, including contractors and service vendors, prior to their being granted authorized access, except for program specified exceptional circumstances that are approved by the single senior management official or their delegate and impact the reliability of the BES or emergency response. Identity should be confirmed in accordance with federal, state, provincial, and local laws, and subject to existing collective bargaining unit agreements. Identity only needs to be confirmed prior to initially granting access and only requires periodic confirmation according to the entity's process during the tenure of employment, which may or may not be the same as the initial verification action.

A seven year criminal history check should be performed for those locations where the individual has resided for at least six consecutive months. This check should also be performed in accordance with federal, state, provincial, and local laws, and subject to existing collective bargaining unit agreements. When it is not possible to perform a full seven year criminal history check, documentation must be made of what criminal history check was performed, and the reasons a full seven-year check could not be performed. Examples of this could include individuals under the age of 25 where a juvenile criminal history may be protected by law, individuals who may have resided in locations from where it is not possible to obtain a criminal history records check, violates the law or is not allowed under the existing collective bargaining agreement. The Responsible Entity should consider the absence of information for the full seven years when assessing the risk of granting access during the process to evaluate the criminal history check. There needs to be a personnel risk assessment that has been completed within the last seven years for each individual with access. A new criminal history records check must be performed as part of the new personnel risk assessment (PRA). Individuals who have been granted access under a previous version of these standards need a new PRA within seven years of the date of their last PRA. The clarifications around the seven year criminal history check in this version do not require a new PRA be performed by the implementation date.

Requirement R4

General Considerations for Requirement R4

None

Rationale for Requirement R4

Authorization for electronic and unescorted physical access must be on the basis of necessity in the individual performing a work function. Documentation showing the authorization should have some justification of the business need included.

This requirement specifies both quarterly reviews and reviews at least once every 15 calendar months. Quarterly reviews are to perform a validation that only authorized users have been granted access to BES Cyber Systems. The focus of this requirement is on the integrity of provisioning access rather than individual accounts on all BES Cyber Assets.

The privilege review at least once every 15 calendar months is more detailed to ensure an individual's associated privileges are the minimum necessary to perform their work function.

If the results of quarterly or at least once every 15 calendar months account reviews indicate an administrative or clerical error in which access was not actually provisioned, then the SDT intends that this error should not be considered a violation of this requirement.

For BES Cyber Systems that do not have user accounts defined, the controls listed in Requirement R4 are not applicable. However, the Responsible Entity should document such configurations.

Requirement R5

General Considerations for Requirement R5

None

Rationale for Requirement R5

Revocation of electronic access should be understood to mean a process with the end result that electronic access to BES Cyber Systems is no longer possible using credentials assigned to or known by the individual(s) whose access privileges are being revoked.

The initial revocation required in Requirement R5 Part 5.1 includes unescorted physical access and Interactive Remote Access. These two actions should prevent any further access by the individual after termination. If an individual still has local access accounts (i.e., accounts on the Cyber Asset itself) on BES Cyber Assets, then the Responsible Entity has 30 days to complete the revocation process for those accounts. However, nothing prevents a Responsible Entity from performing all of the access revocation at the time of termination.

Revocation of access to shared accounts is called out separately to prevent the situation where passwords on substation and generation devices are constantly changed due to staff turnover.

Requirement R5 Part 5.5 specified that passwords for shared account are to be changed within 30 calendar days of the termination action or when the Responsible Entity determines an individual no longer requires access to the account as a result of a reassignment or transfer. The 30 days applies under normal operating conditions. However, circumstances may occur where this is not possible. Some systems may require an outage or reboot of the system in order to complete the password change. In periods of extreme heat or cold, many Responsible Entities may prohibit system outages and reboots in order to maintain reliability of the Bulk Electric System. When these circumstances occur, the Responsible Entity must document these circumstances and prepare to change the password within 10 calendar days following the end of the operating circumstances. Records of activities must be retained to show that the Responsible Entity followed the plan they created.

Requirement R6

General Considerations for Requirement R6

None

Rationale for Requirement R6

Requirement R6 requires Responsible Entities to implement a BES Cyber System Information (BCSI) access management program to ensure that provisioned access to BCSI is authorized, verified, and promptly revoked. Authorization ensures only individuals who have a need are authorized for provisioned access to BCSI. Prompt revocation of terminated individuals' ability to access BCSI helps prevent inappropriate disclosure or use of BCSI. Periodic verification ensures that what is currently provisioned is authorized and still required, and allows the Responsible Entity the opportunity to correct any errors in provisioning.

The change to "provisioned access" instead of "designated storage locations" enables the use of third-party solutions (e.g., cloud services) for BCSI. The concept of "designated storage locations" is too prescriptive and limiting for entities that want to implement file-level rights and permissions (i.e., policy based credentials or encryption keys that follow the file and the provisioned individual), which provide BCSI access controls regardless of storage location. The concept of provisioned access provides the needed flexibility for entities to use other technologies and approaches instead of or in addition to storage locations as a way to meet the access management requirements for BCSI,

especially that which is stored in third-party cloud solutions or is protected at the information/file level no matter where it is located.

According to Requirement R6, Part 6.1, the Responsible Entity must authorize individuals to be given provisioned access to BCSI. First, the Responsible Entity determines who needs the ability to obtain and use BCSI for performing legitimate work functions. Next, a person empowered by the Responsible Entity to do so authorizes—gives permission or approval for—those individuals to be given provisioned access to BCSI. Only then would the Responsible Entity provision access to BCSI as authorized.

Provisioned access is to be considered the result of specific actions taken to provide an individual the means to access BCSI (e.g., physical keys or access cards, user accounts and associated rights and privileges, encryption keys, etc.). In the context of this requirement, an individual is considered to have been provisioned access if they concurrently have the means to both obtain and use the BCSI. To illustrate, an individual who can obtain encrypted BCSI but does not have the encryption keys to be able to use the BCSI has not been provisioned access to the BCSI.

For BCSI in physical format, physical access is provisioned to a physical storage location designated for BCSI and for which access can be provisioned, such as a lockable file cabinet. For BCSI in electronic format, electronic access is provisioned to an electronic system or its contents, or to individual files. Provisioned physical access alone to a physical location housing hardware that contains electronic BCSI is not considered to be provisioned access to the electronic BCSI. Take, for instance, storing BCSI with a cloud service provider. In this case, the cloud service provider's personnel with physical access to the data center is not, by itself, considered provisioned access to the electronic BCSI stored on servers in that data center, as the personnel would also need to be provisioned electronic access to the servers or system. In scenarios like this, the Responsible Entity should implement appropriate information protection controls to help prevent unauthorized access to BCSI per its information protection program, as required in CIP-011-X. The subparts in Requirement R6, Part 6.1 were written to reinforce this concept and clarify access management requirements.

The periodic verification required by Requirement R6 Part 6.2 is to ensure that only authorized individuals have been provisioned access to BCSI and that what is provisioned is what each individual currently needs to perform work functions. For example, by performing the verification, the Responsible Entity might identify individuals who have changed jobs and no longer have a need for provisioned access to BCSI, and would therefore revoke provisioned access.

For Requirement R6 Part 6.3, removal of an individual's ability to use provisioned access to BCSI is considered to mean a process with the result that electronic access to electronic BCSI and physical access to physical BCSI is no longer possible from that point in time onwards using the means the individual had been given to obtain and use BCSI in those circumstances. Either what was specifically provisioned to give an individual access to BCSI (e.g., keys, local user or database accounts and associated privileges, etc.) is taken away, deleted, disabled, revoked, etc. (also known as "deprovisioning"), or some primary access is removed which prevents the individual from using the specifically provisioned means. Requirement R6 Part 6.3 acknowledges that where removing unescorted physical access and Interactive Remote Access, such as is required in Requirement R5 Part 5.1, prevents any further access to BCSI by the individual after termination, then this would constitute removal of an individual's ability to use provisioned access to BCSI. Access can only be revoked or removed where access has been provisioned. The intent is not to have to retrieve individual pieces of BCSI (e.g., documents) that might be in someone's possession (although you should if you can, but the individual cannot un-see what they have already seen).

Where no specific mechanisms are available or feasible for provisioning access to BCSI, these requirements are not applicable. For example, there is no available or feasible mechanism to provision access in instances when an individual is merely given, views, or might see BCSI, such as when the individual is handed a piece of paper during a meeting or sees a whiteboard in a conference room. Likewise, these requirements are not applicable where provisioned electronic or physical access is not specifically intended to provide an individual the means to obtain and

use BCSI. There will likely be no specific provisioning of access to BCSI on workstations, laptops, flash drives, portable equipment, offices, vehicles, etc., especially when BCSI is only temporarily or incidentally located or stored there. Another example is the provisioning of access to a substation, the intent of which is to enable an individual to gain access to the substation to perform substation-related work tasks, not to access BCSI that may be located there. However, BCSI in these locations and situations still needs to be protected against unauthorized access per the Responsible Entity's information protection program as required by CIP-011-X.

The change to "provisioned access" to BCSI is backwards compatible with the previous "designated storage locations" concept. Entities have likely designated only those storage locations to which access can be provisioned, rather than any location where BCSI might be found. Both concepts intend to exclude those locations where BCSI is temporarily stored, as explained in the previous paragraph. Provisioned access, like designated storage locations, maintains the scope to a finite and discrete object that is manageable and auditable, rather than trying to manage access to individual pieces of information. The removal of the term "designated storage location" does not preclude an entity from defining storage locations for the entity's access management program for authorization, verification, and revocation of access to BCSI.

Technical Rationale for Reliability Standard CIP-004-6

This section contains a “cut and paste” of the former Guidelines and Technical Basis (GTB) as-is of from CIP-004-6 standard to preserve any historical references. No modifications have been made.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Section 4 – Scope of Applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Standards

Section “4. Applicability” of the standards provides important information for Responsible Entities to determine the scope of the applicability of the CIP Cyber Security Requirements.

Section “4.1. Functional Entities” is a list of NERC functional entities to which the standard applies. If the entity is registered as one or more of the functional entities listed in Section 4.1, then the NERC CIP Cyber Security Standards apply. Note that there is a qualification in Section 4.1 that restricts the applicability in the case of Distribution Providers to only those that own certain types of systems and equipment listed in 4.2.

Section “4.2. Facilities” defines the scope of the Facilities, systems, and equipment owned by the Responsible Entity, as qualified in Section 4.1, that is subject to the requirements of the standard. As specified in the exemption section 4.2.3.5, this standard does not apply to Responsible Entities that do not have High Impact or Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems under CIP-002-5.1’s categorization. In addition to the set of BES Facilities, Control Centers, and other systems and equipment, the list includes the set of systems and equipment owned by Distribution Providers. While the NERC Glossary term “Facilities” already includes the BES characteristic, the additional use of the term BES here is meant to reinforce the scope of applicability of these Facilities where it is used, especially in this applicability scoping section. This in effect sets the scope of Facilities, systems, and equipment that is subject to the standards.

Requirement R1:

The security awareness program is intended to be an informational program, not a formal training program. It should reinforce security practices to ensure that personnel maintain awareness of best practices for both physical and electronic security to protect its BES Cyber Systems. The Responsible Entity is not required to provide records that show that each individual received or understood the information, but they must maintain documentation of the program materials utilized in the form of posters, memos, and/or presentations.

Examples of possible mechanisms and evidence, when dated, which can be used are:

- Direct communications (e.g., emails, memos, computer based training, etc.);
- Indirect communications (e.g., posters, intranet, brochures, etc.);
- Management support and reinforcement (e.g., presentations, meetings, etc.).

Requirement R2:

Training shall cover the policies, access controls, and procedures as developed for the BES Cyber Systems and include, at a minimum, the required items appropriate to personnel roles and responsibilities from Table R2. The Responsible Entity has the flexibility to define the training program and it may consist of multiple modules and multiple delivery mechanisms, but a single training program for all individuals needing to be trained is acceptable. The training can focus on functions, roles or responsibilities at the discretion of the Responsible Entity.

One new element in the training content is intended to encompass networking hardware and software and other issues of electronic interconnectivity supporting the operation and control of BES Cyber Systems as per FERC Order No. 706, Paragraph 434. Additionally, training should address the risk posed when connecting and using Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media with BES Cyber Systems or within an Electronic Security Perimeter. As noted in FERC Order No. 791, Paragraph 135, Transient Cyber Assets and Removable Media have been the source of incidents where malware was introduced into electric generation industrial control systems in real-world situations. Training on their use is a key element in protecting BES Cyber Systems. This is not intended to provide technical training to individuals supporting networking hardware and software, but educating system users of the cyber security risks associated with the interconnectedness of these systems. The users, based on their function, role, or responsibility, should have a basic understanding of which systems can be accessed from other systems and how the actions they take can affect cyber security.

Each Responsible Entity shall ensure all personnel who are granted authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to its BES Cyber Systems, including contractors and service vendors, complete cyber security training prior to their being granted authorized access, except for CIP Exceptional Circumstances. To retain the authorized accesses, individuals must complete the training at least one every 15 months.

Requirement R3:

Each Responsible Entity shall ensure a personnel risk assessment is performed for all personnel who are granted authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to its BES Cyber Systems, including contractors and service vendors, prior to their being granted authorized access, except for program specified exceptional circumstances that are approved by the single senior management official or their delegate and impact the reliability of the BES or emergency response. Identity should be confirmed in accordance with federal, state, provincial, and local laws, and subject to existing collective bargaining unit agreements. Identity only needs to be confirmed prior to initially granting access and only requires periodic confirmation according to the entity's process during the tenure of employment, which may or may not be the same as the initial verification action.


A seven year criminal history check should be performed for those locations where the individual has resided for at least six consecutive months. This check should also be performed in accordance with federal, state, provincial, and local laws, and subject to existing collective bargaining unit agreements. When it is not possible to perform a full seven year criminal history check, documentation must be made of what criminal history check was performed, and the reasons a full seven-year check could not be performed. Examples of this could include individuals under the age of 25 where a juvenile criminal history may be protected by law, individuals who may have resided in locations from where it is not possible to obtain a criminal history records check, violates the law or is not allowed under the existing collective bargaining agreement. The Responsible Entity should consider the absence of information for the full seven years when assessing the risk of granting access during the process to evaluate the criminal history check. There needs to be a personnel risk assessment that has been completed within the last seven years for each individual with access. A new criminal history records check must be performed as part of the new PRA. Individuals who have been granted access under a previous version of these standards need a new PRA within seven years of the date of their last PRA. The clarifications around the seven year criminal history check in this version do not require a new PRA be performed by the implementation date.

Requirement R4:

Authorization for electronic and unescorted physical access and access to BES Cyber System Information must be on the basis of necessity in the individual performing a work function. Documentation showing the authorization should have some justification of the business need included. To ensure proper segregation of duties, access authorization and provisioning should not be performed by the same person where possible.

This requirement specifies both quarterly reviews and reviews at least once every 15 calendar months. Quarterly reviews are to perform a validation that only authorized users have been granted access to BES Cyber Systems. This is achieved by comparing individuals actually provisioned to a BES Cyber System against records of individuals authorized to the BES Cyber System. The focus of this requirement is on the integrity of provisioning access rather than individual accounts on all BES Cyber Assets. The list of provisioned individuals can be an automatically generated account listing. However, in a BES Cyber System with several account databases, the list of provisioned individuals may come from other records such as provisioning workflow or a user account database where provisioning typically initiates.

The privilege review at least once every 15 calendar months is more detailed to ensure an individual’s associated privileges are the minimum necessary to perform their work function (i.e., least privilege). Entities can more efficiently perform this review by implementing role-based access. This involves determining the specific roles on the system (e.g., system operator, technician, report viewer, administrator, etc.) then grouping access privileges to the role and assigning users to the role. Role-based access does not assume any specific software and can be implemented by defining specific provisioning processes for each role where access group assignments cannot be performed. Role-based access permissions eliminate the need to perform the privilege review on individual accounts. An example timeline of all the reviews in Requirement R4 is included below.



Separation of duties should be considered when performing the reviews in Requirement R4. The person reviewing should be different than the person provisioning access.

If the results of quarterly or at least once every 15 calendar months account reviews indicate an administrative or clerical error in which access was not actually provisioned, then the SDT intends that this error should not be considered a violation of this requirement.

For BES Cyber Systems that do not have user accounts defined, the controls listed in Requirement R4 are not applicable. However, the Responsible Entity should document such configurations.

Requirement R5:

The requirement to revoke access at the time of the termination action includes procedures showing revocation of access concurrent with the termination action. This requirement recognizes that the timing of the termination action may vary depending on the circumstance. Some common scenarios and possible processes on when the termination action occurs are provided in the following table. These scenarios are not an exhaustive list of all scenarios, but are representative of several routine business practices.

Scenario	Possible Process
Immediate involuntary termination	Human resources or corporate security escorts the individual off site and the supervisor or human resources personnel notify the appropriate personnel to begin the revocation process.
Scheduled involuntary termination	Human resources personnel are notified of the termination and work with appropriate personnel to schedule the revocation of access at the time of termination.
Voluntary termination	Human resources personnel are notified of the termination and work with appropriate personnel to schedule the revocation of access at the time of termination.
Retirement where the last working day is several weeks prior to the termination date	Human resources personnel coordinate with manager to determine the final date access is no longer needed and schedule the revocation of access on the determined day.
Death	Human resources personnel are notified of the death and work with appropriate personnel to begin the revocation process.

Revocation of electronic access should be understood to mean a process with the end result that electronic access to BES Cyber Systems is no longer possible using credentials assigned to or known by the individual(s) whose access privileges are being revoked. Steps taken to accomplish this outcome may include deletion or deactivation of accounts used by the individual(s), but no specific actions are prescribed. Entities should consider the ramifications of deleting an account may include incomplete event log entries due to an unrecognized account or system services using the account to log on.

The initial revocation required in Requirement R5.1 includes unescorted physical access and Interactive Remote Access. These two actions should prevent any further access by the individual after termination. If an individual still has local access accounts (i.e., accounts on the Cyber Asset itself) on BES Cyber Assets, then the Responsible Entity has 30 days to complete the revocation process for those accounts. However, nothing prevents a Responsible Entity from performing all of the access revocation at the time of termination.

For transferred or reassigned individuals, a review of access privileges should be performed. This review could entail a simple listing of all authorizations for an individual and working with the respective managers to determine which access will still be needed in the new position. For instances in which the individual still needs to retain access as part of a transitory period, the entity should schedule a time to review these access privileges or include the privileges in the quarterly account review or annual privilege review.

Revocation of access to shared accounts is called out separately to prevent the situation where passwords on substation and generation devices are constantly changed due to staff turnover.

Requirement 5.5 specified that passwords for shared account are to be changed within 30 calendar days of the termination action or when the Responsible Entity determines an individual no longer requires access to the account as a result of a reassignment or transfer. The 30 days applies under normal operating conditions. However, circumstances may occur where this is not possible. Some systems may require an outage or reboot of the system in order to complete the password change. In periods of extreme heat or cold, many Responsible Entities may prohibit system outages and reboots in order to maintain reliability of the BES. When these circumstances occur, the Responsible Entity must document these circumstances and prepare to change the password within 10 calendar days

following the end of the operating circumstances. Records of activities must be retained to show that the Responsible Entity followed the plan they created.

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for Requirement R1:

Ensures that Responsible Entities with personnel who have authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access to BES Cyber Assets take action so that those personnel with such authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access maintain awareness of the Responsible Entity’s security practices.

Rationale for Requirement R2:

To ensure that the Responsible Entity’s training program for personnel who need authorized electronic access and/or authorized unescorted physical access to BES Cyber Systems covers the proper policies, access controls, and procedures to protect BES Cyber Systems and are trained before access is authorized.

Rationale for Requirement R3:

To ensure that individuals who need authorized electronic or authorized unescorted physical access to BES Cyber Systems have been assessed for risk. Whether initial access or maintaining access, those with access must have had a personnel risk assessment completed within the last 7 years.

Rationale for Requirement R4:

To ensure that individuals with access to BES Cyber Systems and the physical and electronic locations where BES Cyber System Information is stored by the Responsible Entity have been properly authorized for such access. “Authorization” should be considered to be a grant of permission by a person or persons empowered by the Responsible Entity to perform such grants and included in the delegations referenced in CIP-003-6. “Provisioning” should be considered the actions to provide access to an individual.

Access is physical, logical, and remote permissions granted to Cyber Assets composing the BES Cyber System or allowing access to the BES Cyber System. When granting, reviewing, or revoking access, the Responsible Entity must address the Cyber Asset specifically as well as the systems used to enable such access (i.e., physical access control system, remote access system, directory services).

CIP Exceptional Circumstances are defined in a Responsible Entity’s policy from CIP-003-6 and allow an exception to the requirement for authorization to BES Cyber Systems and BES Cyber System Information.

Quarterly reviews in Part 4.5 are to perform a validation that only authorized users have been granted access to BES Cyber Systems. This is achieved by comparing individuals actually provisioned to a BES Cyber System against records of individuals authorized to access the BES Cyber System. The focus of this requirement is on the integrity of provisioning access rather than individual accounts on all BES Cyber Assets. The list of provisioned individuals can be an automatically generated account listing. However, in a BES Cyber System with several account databases, the list of provisioned individuals may come from other records such as provisioning workflow or a user account database where provisioning typically initiates.

If the results of quarterly or annual account reviews indicate an administrative or clerical error in which access was not actually provisioned, then the SDT intends that the error should not be considered a violation of this requirement.

For BES Cyber Systems that do not have user accounts defined, the controls listed in Requirement R4 are not applicable. However, the Responsible Entity should document such configurations.

Rationale for Requirement R5:

The timely revocation of electronic access to BES Cyber Systems is an essential element of an access management regime. When an individual no longer requires access to a BES Cyber System to perform his or her assigned functions, that access should be revoked. This is of particular importance in situations where a change of assignment or employment is involuntary, as there is a risk the individual(s) involved will react in a hostile or destructive manner.

In considering how to address directives in FERC Order No. 706 directing “immediate” revocation of access for involuntary separation, the SDT chose not to specify hourly time parameters in the requirement (e.g., revoking access within 1 hour). The point in time at which an organization terminates a person cannot generally be determined down to the hour. However, most organizations have formal termination processes, and the timeliest revocation of access occurs in concurrence with the initial processes of termination.

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